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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the impact of short sale constraints on stock price efficiency upon arrival of 
analyst downgrades. Examining the speed of which stock price response to analyst downgrades 
for pilot (short sale non-constrained) stocks and control (short sale constrained) stocks in an 
intra-day setting, I find evidence supporting the hypothesis that short sale constrains hamper 
intra-day stock price efficiency.  For after-hours downgrades, pilot stocks respond quickly, with 
virtually all of the price response incorporated by the following open, while control stocks take an 
extra five minutes after opening to fully reflect the new information. For during-hour downgrades, 
the negative information is partially incorporated into pilot stock prices up to two hours before the 
recommendation is released, while control stocks take up to an hour and a half after the release to 
impound the information into stock price, confirming that short sale constraints lower stock price 
efficiency. 
 
Keywords: Analyst Downgrades; Short Sale Constraints; Uptick Rule; Stock Price Efficiency 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he existing literature shows that financial analysts’ recommendations are informative and have 
incremental investment value (Womack, 1996; Kim et al., 1997; Barber et al., 2001; Brav and 
Lehavy, 2003; and Green, 2006). Yet the stock price reactions to analysts’ upgrades and downgrades 
are asymmetric. Womack (1996) shows that bad news be incorporated into stock price much more slowly than good 
news. It has been hypothesized that short sale constraints prevent negative information from being registered into the 
stock price by restricting pessimistic investors from short selling while imposing no such restriction for optimistic 
investors (Miller, 1977; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987). Recent empirical studies offer evidence that stock prices 
are less efficient when short sale constraints are in place (Bris et al., 2007; Saffi and Sigurdson, 2010; and Boehmer 
and Wu, 2007). However, these studies cannot directly reveal how actual short selling activity affects the 
informational efficiency of stock prices in an intra-day fashion due to data limitation. To fill this gap, this paper 
explores directly the mechanism in which short sale constraints hampers stock price efficiency by using high 
frequency data of short selling activity and stock prices. The unique study design in this paper is characterized by 
choosing analyst recommendations as information events, using the speed of price response to recommendation 
changes as the direct measures of stock price efficiency, and adopting the uptick rule exempt status as the proxy for 
short sale constraints.  The uptick rule is a short sale constraint in which a short sale is only allowed at a price that is 
greater than or equal to the previous trading prices,  known as the SEC 10a-1 Rule. Using the tick-by-tick 
Regulation SHO data from 2005 I examine the market response to the release of analyst downgrades for stocks that 
are exempt from uptick rule restrictions (pilot stocks) and stocks that are subject to such restrictions (control stocks). 
 
For after-hour financial analyst downgrades, pilot stocks respond quickly, with virtually all of the price 
response incorporated by the following open, while control stocks take an extra five minutes after opening to fully 
reflect the new information. For downgrades that occur during normal trading hours, the information is partially 
incorporated into pilot stock prices up to two hours before the recommendation is released, while control stocks take 
up to an hour and a half to impound the information into stock price. Both results suggest that short sale constraint 
T 
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reduce the speed with which negative information is incorporated into stock prices. Given lower levels of non-
exempt shorting in pilot stocks, rapid price response occurs, confirming the hypothesis that short sale constraints 
hamper the stock price efficiency. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the intra-day evidence of improved 
price efficiency due to the suspension of uptick rules extends recent studies on shorting-efficiency relationship. Due 
to the low frequency of the data, previous studies used cannot directly reveal how short sale constraints affect 
informational efficiency on an intra-day basis (Bris et al., 2007, Boehmer and Wu, 2013, and Saffi and Sigurdsson, 
2010). In this paper, high frequency data allows us to adopt the speed of price response to analyst downgrades as an 
intra-day direct measure of price efficiency. 
 
Second, this paper adds to the literature that uses the Regulation SHO data to examine the impact of the 
pilot program on market quality (Diether et al., 2009a; Alexander and Peterson, 2008). While these studies examine 
general market quality measures such as bid-ask spread, bid and ask depth, liquidity, and volatility, this paper 
focuses on one key dimension of market quality, informational stock price efficiency. This study provides direct 
intra-day evidence on how short sale constraints affects stock price efficiency. 
 
Third, this paper is related to the literature on the investment value of financial analyst recommendations. 
Green (2006) shows that early access to stock recommendations provides investors with 1.5% two day returns from 
shorting stocks with downgrade recommendation, and that the profit opportunities persist for only two hours 
following the pre-market release of analyst recommendation changes. This result highlights the speed at which 
private information is incorporated into stock prices and motivates us to use high frequency short selling data. This 
paper complements the literature by conducting an intra-day analysis of stock price response to analyst 
recommendations that are released during both after-hour and normal trading hour periods. 
 
Nevertheless, this study has a number of limitations. First, I only use data on NYSE and this restricts our 
ability to generalize the conclusions to stocks listed on NASDAQ. Second, I only examine the impact of short 
selling on a specific information event—analyst downgrades. There may be other events for which the different 
information driven short selling patterns associated with the suspension of the uptick rule can be discovered. Third, 
due to limitations in data, I could not test whether after hour shorting and shorting at the market opening auction are 
important forces that contribute to the improved stock price efficiency. Such analyses would be an interesting and 
promising extension for future research. 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes data 
and constructs samples. Section 4 conducts empirical tests. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section, I review literature in three different areas: (1) Investment value of analyst recommendations; 
(2) Informativeness of short selling; and (3) Short sale constraints and stock price efficiency. 
 
2.1 Investment Value of Analyst Recommendations 
 
Existing literature suggests that sell-side analysts’ recommendations have incremental investment value. 
For example, Womack (1996) examine the price and volume reactions to analyst’s recommendation changes and 
provides evidence that brokerage firm analysts appear to have market timing and stock-picking ability. He 
documents a size-adjusted return of –4.7% in the three-day event period window and a –9.1% post-recommendation 
drift over a six-month post event period for sell recommendations in contrast to a 3 % event window return and 
2.4% short-lived post-event drift for buy recommendations. Consistent with Womack (1996)’s results, Barber et al. 
(2001) use a different method from a more investor-oriented calendar time perspective and find that a portfolio 
comprised of the most (or least) highly recommended stocks provides an average annual abnormal return of 4.13 (-
4.91)%. In addition, Brav and Lehavy (2003) examine market reaction to analysts’ target price announcement and 
find that target prices, recommendations, and earnings forecasts are informative and contain information about six-
month post-event abnormal returns. Furthermore, Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) provide evidence that the 
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informativeness of analysts’ recommendation revisions increase before the firm’s earnings announcement date, 
indicating that the investment value of analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations stems more from their 
independent collection of information than from the interpretation of public information, such as management 
earnings guidance. This result provides a strong motive for this study to use analyst recommendations as a proxy for 
private information. Mikhail et al. (2004) provide evidence of persistence in analyst stock picking ability and show 
that analysts who have issued more (or less) profitable recommendations in the past tend to issue more (or less) 
profitable recommendations in the future. Finally, Green (2006) shows that early access to stock recommendations 
provides investors with a significant investment value with 1.5% two day returns by shorting stocks with downgrade 
recommendation after controlling for transaction costs, and that short-term profit opportunities persist for only two 
hours following the premarket release of analyst recommendation changes. 
 
2.2 Informativeness of Short Selling 
 
Early empirical work in this area utilizes monthly short interest data and provides evidence that short 
sellers are sophisticated and well-informed investors. For example, Asquith and Meulbroek (1996) provide evidence 
that short sellers successfully identify securities that subsequently under-perform in the market. By examining 
private information about firms’ earnings announcements, Senchack and Starks (1993) test the stock price reaction 
to earnings announcements and find that the greater the change in unexpected short interest, the more negative is the 
market reaction to short interest. In addition, Dechow et al. (2001) examined the informativeness of short selling by 
linking the short interest with stock’s fundamental ratios, such as size and book to market ratio. They found that 
short sellers were able to identify over-valued stocks. Furthermore, Desai et al. (2002) examine the relationship 
between the level of short interest and stock returns on the NASDAQ from 1988 to 1994 and find that heavily 
shorted stocks experience significant negative abnormal annual return of up to -13.56% after controlling for market 
return, firm size, book to market, and momentum factors. 
 
Monthly short interest data only provides a static shot of the short selling activities during an entire month 
and is unable to capture the short-term pattern for short sellers’ behavior. It is very likely that the speed of price 
adjustment may occur in an intra-day fashion. By using daily short sales data researchers are able to take a closer 
look at short sellers’ behavior and conduct empirical tests that deliver more convincing evidence. For example, 
using intra-day short selling data from the Australia Stock Exchange, Aitken et al. (1998) find that short sales are 
negatively associated with stock returns, and provide evidence that short sales around information events are 
associated with a larger stock price reaction. In the U.S., Christophe et al. (2004) use a unique daily short selling 
dataset from NASDAQ’s automated confirmation transaction service (ACT) to investigate the short selling before 
earnings announcements. They find that abnormal short selling is significantly related to post announcement stock 
returns, and that the level of pre-announcement short selling mostly appears to reflect firm specific information 
rather than the fundamental characteristics. In addition, Bohmer et al. (2006) use NYSE SuperDot system data 
associated with short selling from 2000 to 2004, and find that short sellers are extremely well informed. They 
document that stocks with heavy shorting under-perform by 1.16% in the following 20 days, and that institutional 
non-program short sales and large short selling orders are most informative. 
 
More recently, when Regulation SHO data, an intra-day short selling dataset that covers all listed 
companies in a given Exchange became available, many researchers used this comprehensive and high frequency 
data to re-examine the short sellers’ behavior during a short period, from 2005 to 2006. For example, using 
NASDAQ SHO data for the first 6 months of 2005, Diether et al. (2009b) find that increasing short sales predicts 
future negative return, and that small trades have high predictive power. 
 
2.3 Short Sale Constraints and Stock Price Efficiency 
 
A large body of literature has revolved around the themes of information arrival and stock price efficiency 
in the context of short sale constraints. For example, Miller (1977) argues that short sale constraints prevent negative 
information from being registered into the stock price by restricting pessimistic investors from short selling while 
imposing no such restriction for optimistic investors, leading to an upwardly biased stock price, especially when 
investors’ opinions diverge. Similarly, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) develop a rational expectations model in 
which investors take short sale constraints into consideration in formulating their trading decisions. They argue that 
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short sale constraints limit trades from both informed and uninformed short sellers and reduce stock price 
informational efficiency, especially on the private bad news side. Their model shows that the loss of informational 
efficiency from short sale constraints increases the risk as perceived by less informed investors, thus driving down 
the security price. 
 
Empirically, Bris et al. (2007) examine the shorting-efficiency relation in 46 different countries by using 
delayed price response to market shocks as a proxy for price efficiency. They found that stock price in countries 
with constraints in place are less efficient than those where investors are allowed to short stocks. In addition, Saffi 
and Sigurdsson (2010) compared short selling in 26 markets around the world, and found that short sale constraints 
are associated with lower price efficiency measured by the correlation between contemporaneous stock returns and 
lagged market returns and the R square of a market model regression. More recently, Boehmer and Wu (2013) used 
the dispersion of the pricing error as the measure of informational efficiency of stock prices and found that increased 
daily short selling activities due to suspension of the uptick rule for pilot stocks directly drove the improvement in 
price efficiency. These studies, due to the data frequency limitation, focus on various types of price efficiency 
measures and daily evidence on the shorting-efficiency relation. In this study, high-frequency data allows us to use 
the speed of stock price response to analyst downgrades as an intra-day measure of price efficiency. 
 
3. DATA AND SAMPLES 
 
The short selling data is from the Regulation SHO dataset. The SEC chosen pilot stocks from the Russell 
3000 membership list. All securities in the Russell 3000 Index were ranked by average daily dollar trading volume 
for the previous year. Then, every third stock was chosen as the pilot stock, and the remaining stocks are “control 
stocks”. The Russell 3000 membership lists are obtained from the Russell Company.  To eliminate the potential 
effect of index inclusion or index exclusion on stock returns, this study requires that sample stocks are members of 
the Russell 3000 index after the June 2004 reconstitution and remained in the Russell 3000 member list after the 
June 2005 reconstitution. Thus, stocks that were added to the index due to IPOs during the period June 2004 through 
2005 are excluded, as well as stocks that were eliminated during the same period due to mergers, bankruptcies, and 
ticker changes. The control sample was obtained by excluding stocks on pilot stock list as of May 2, 2005, which is 
roughly twice as large as the pilot sample. As the results of these screens, our samples consist of 464 pilot stocks and 
826 control stocks listed on the NYSE. 
 
To examine the impact of the uptick rule on stock price efficiency, I compare stock price responses to 
analyst downgrades from May to December of 2005, a period featured by the different short sale constraints for pilot 
and control stocks. I define this period as the post-SHO period. If the suspension of the uptick rule contributes to the 
different price response patterns for the pilot and control sample, then similar intra-day price response patterns 
before the Pilot Program will be seen, when pilot stocks and control stocks have the identical treatment on the short 
selling price test restrictions. Therefore, I also examine stock price response to analyst downgrades for pilot and 
control stocks from January to April of 2005, a period featured by the same uptick rule treatment for the pilot and 
control stocks. This period is defined as the pre-SHO period. Tick-by-tick stock trade prices were obtained from the 
NYSE TAQ data set. Stock returns, trading volume, and other firm specific characteristic variables are extracted 
from the Center for Research in Securities Price (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT. Data for financial analysts’ 
recommendations for stocks in our samples were obtained from Frist Call dataset. The recommendation value is 
defined as followings: one is “buy”; two is “overweight”; three is “neutral”; four is “underweight”; five is “sell”; 
and zero is the initiation of recommendation.  To examine the stock price response to an information event, it is 
important to ensure that investors have access to these analyst recommendations. In this section, I focus on analyst 
downgrades that are released outside of regular trading hours, either before 9:30am or after 4:00pm, and examine the 
stock price response after the open at 9:30 am. Further, to ensure that the analyst recommendation represent 
significant information events that have material impact on stock value, this study focuses on stock 
recommendations issued by the 20 highest rated U.S. brokerage research departments, as designated by Institutional 
Investor.  To measure the informational significance of downgrades, recommendation changes are defined here as 
the difference between the previous recommendation and the current recommendation for the same brokerage firm. 
For the initiation of recommendation, the recommendation change is specified as the deviation of the current 
recommendation from the neutral recommendation with the rating value of 3. For example, if brokerage firm X 
initiates a research on stock Y with a rating of 1 or buy, then the recommendation change is 3-1=2, representing an 
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upgrade recommendation. On any given day, if there are multiple recommendation changes for one stock, a simple 
average of those changes is taken as the value of the recommendation change on that date for that stock. Finally, a 
recommendation change is classified as a downgrade if the value of a recommendation change is negative, as an 
upgrade if the value of the recommendation change is positive. Table 1 presents the number of upgrades and 
downgrades for samples. It shows that the mean and the distribution of downgrade magnitude for both pilot and 
control stocks. The differences between pilot- and control-stocks are not statistically distinguishable. Pre-SHO 
represents a period from January to April of 2005 and Post-SHO represents a period from May to December of 
2005. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Analyst Downgrades 
 
Pre-SHO Post-SHO 
 
Pilot Control Pilot Control 
# of downgrades 143 373 277 605 
Mean value of downgrades -1.97 -2.02 -1.45 -1.46 
Stderr of mean values 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.011 
Distribution of downgrades     % of -4 downgrades 5.05% 5.02% 0.64% 0.71% 
% of -3 downgrades 23.91% 26.10% 4.26% 4.24% 
% of -2 downgrades 33.96% 34.31% 35.57% 35.11% 
% of -1 downgrades 37.08% 34.57% 59.53% 59.94% 
 
4. EMPIRICAL TESTING 
 
4. 1 Stock Price Response to After-Hour Analyst Downgrades for Pilot and Control Stocks 
 
This study hypothesizes that short sale constraints hamper stock price efficiency upon the arrival of analyst 
downgrade information. The uptick rule is adopted as the proxy of the short sale constraint in this paper. To directly 
examine whether short sale constraints hamper stock price efficiency I examine the speed of the stock price response 
on the day that analyst downgrades become publicly available for both pilot and control stocks. This method has 
several advantages. First, it is a simple, direct, and straightforward way to measure the stock price efficiency. 
Second, it examines the informational efficiency of stock prices in the context of true information setting, namely, 
analyst recommendations. Third, it uses the uptick rule as the proxy for short sale constraint, which is least likely to 
be subject to endogeneity concerns. Finally, it provides closer and more magnified evidence on how price response 
actually occur for short sale constrained stocks (control stocks) and less short sale constrained stocks (pilot stocks). 
 
The Kim et al. (1997)’s mean-adjusted method is used to compute abnormal returns. Mean returns are 
calculated for each stock at the estimation period, day-50 to -3. To examine the timing of those price responses, 
stock abnormal returns are calculated for each time intervals on the event day, including the opening returns, for 
each analyst downgrade during both the pre- and post-SHO periods.  Then I compare over time the sizes of the 
average abnormal price response for pilot- and control-stocks. 
 
During the pre-SHO period, the uptick rule is imposed for both pilot and control stocks, I would expect the 
similar price response pattern for these stocks. During the post-SHO period, the uptick rule is suspended for pilot 
stocks. The relaxation of the short sale constraints should improve the price efficiency in pilot stocks. I expect that it 
takes much less time for the market to respond to the analyst downgrades in pilot stocks than in control stocks. 
 
Table 2 reports average abnormal returns during the market opening (4:00pm-9:30am), five-minute 
intervals between 9:30am and 10:30am, and time intervals 10:30am-12:00am, 12:00-3:00pm, and 3:00-4:00pm for 
pilot- and control-stocks during both pre- and post-SHO periods. These returns are graphed in Figure 1 (pre-SHO 
period) and Figure 2 (post-SHO period). The average abnormal returns in a given intervals is obtained by average 
across the sample stocks. I use t-tests with the standard error computed across sample stocks to evaluate the 
significance of the average abnormal returns in a given interval. 
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Table 2. Stock Price Responses to Analyst Downgrades on NYSE 
 Pre SHO Post SHO Time-
interval Pilot Control Diff t-stat Pilot Control Diff t-stat 
 (1) (2) 
(3) = 
(1)-(2)  (4) (5) 
(6)= 
(4)-(5)  
16:00-9:30am -2.44%*** -2.22%*** -0.22% -0.51 -2.96%*** -2.10%*** -0.86%** -1.99 
 (0.0033) (0.0028)   (0.0032) (0.0029)   9:30-9:35am -0.58%** -0.62%*** 0.04% 0.12 -0.23% -0.73%*** 0.50%** 1.98 
 (0.0028) (0.002)   (0.0021) (0.0014)   9:35-9:40am -0.18% -0.16% -0.02% -0.06 -0.08% -0.15% 0.07% 0.27 
 (0.0029) (0.002)   (0.0021) (0.0015)   9:40-9:45am -0.07% -0.15% 0.08% 0.22 -0.01% -0.07% 0.06% 0.23 
 (0.003) (0.0021)   (0.0021) (0.0015)   9:45-9:50am -0.06% -0.02% -0.04% -0.11 -0.05% -0.10% 0.05% 0.19 
 (0.003) (0.0021)   (0.0022) (0.0015)   9:50-9:55am -0.03% -0.01% -0.02% -0.05 0.02% 0.08% -0.06% -0.23 
 (0.003) (0.0022)   (0.0022) (0.0015)   9:55-10:00am -0.03% 0.00% -0.03% -0.08 0.02% -0.12% 0.14% 0.54 
 (0.003) (0.0022)   (0.0021) (0.0015)   10:00-
10:05am -0.03% -0.05% 0.02% 0.05 0.02% 0.00% 0.02% 0.08 
 (0.0031) (0.0022)   (0.0022) (0.0015)   10:05-
10:10am 0.00% -0.01% 0.01% 0.03 0.00% -0.02% 0.02% 0.08 
 (0.003) (0.0023)   (0.0022) (0.0015)   10:10-
10:15am -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% -0.03 0.01% -0.02% 0.03% 0.11 
 (0.0031) (0.0023)   (0.0022) (0.0015)   10:15-
10:20am 0.04% -0.01% 0.05% 0.13 0.00% -0.03% 0.03% 0.11 
 (0.0031) (0.0023)   (0.0022) (0.0015)   10:20-
10:25am -0.04% -0.02% -0.02% -0.05 0.02% 0.00% 0.02% 0.08 
 (0.0032) (0.0023)   (0.0022) (0.0015)   10:25-
10:30am -0.03% 0.00% -0.03% -0.08 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.04 
 (0.0032) (0.0023)   (0.0022) (0.0015)   10:30-
12:00pm -0.04% -0.07% 0.03% 0.07 -0.14% -0.12% -0.02% -0.07 
 (0.0032) (0.0024)   (0.0023) (0.0015)   12:00-3:00pm -0.10% 0.06% -0.16% -0.39 -0.03% -0.04% 0.01% 0.04 
 (0.0034) (0.0023)   (0.0024) (0.0015)   3:00-4:00pm -0.09% -0.10% 0.01% 0.02 0.13% 0.04% 0.09% 0.31 
 (0.0036) (0.0024)   (0.0024) (0.0016)   The standard errors are presented in parentheses below the means. Diff is the difference of abnormal stock returns for each time 
interval between pilot and control samples. *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
During the pre-SHO period, for both pilot and control stocks, the average abnormal returns during the 
market opening is -2.44% and -2.22%, respectively. Both are statistically significant at 1% level. The average 
abnormal returns during the first five-minute interval after the opening are -0.58% and -0.62% for pilot and control 
stocks. Both are statistically significant. The average abnormal returns in the subsequent intervals are small and not 
significant for both pilot and control stocks. Results here indicate that most of the information contained in analyst 
downgrades is reflected stock prices at the opening trade and trades that occur with the succeeding five minutes. 
Comparing abnormal returns for pilot and control stocks, there are no statistically significant differences for all time 
intervals. It indicates that during the pre-SHO period when the uptick rule is equally binding for all stocks, stock 
price responses following the release of analyst downgrades are similar for pilot and control stocks. 
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Figure 1. Stock Price Response to After-hour Downgrades during the pre-SHO Period 
 
 
During the post-SHO period, however, the average abnormal returns during the market opening are -2.96% 
and -2.10% for pilot and control stocks, with the difference statistically different at 5% level. The average abnormal 
return during the first five-minute interval for pilot stocks is not significantly different from zero, while the average 
abnormal return during the same interval for control stocks is -0.73%, statistically significant at 1% level. The 
difference between pilot and control stocks is statistically significant at 5% level. Results here indicate that when the 
uptick rule is suspended for pilot stocks, virtually all information contained in the analyst downgrades has been 
incorporated into stock prices during the market opening, and it takes an extra five minutes for control stocks to 
impound all negative information into stock prices. Overall, results in Table 2 suggests that the suspension of the 
uptick rule during the post-SHO period speed up the stock price responses to after-hour analyst downgrades by up to 
five minutes. The opening prices for pilot stocks better reflect the downgrade information than those of control 
stocks. In other words, informational price efficiency measured by the speed of price response to downgrades has 
been improved when short sale constrains are removed. 
 
Figure 2. Stock Price Response to After-hour Downgrades during the Post-SHO Period 
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There are several possible reasons other than uptick rule restrictions why pilot stock prices would respond 
more rapidly to downgrades than control stocks. First, the samples may not perfectly matched.  The number of 
observations in the control sample is about twice as many as in the pilot sample. Also, these two samples are not 
matched on firm size and book-to-market ratio. These variables are important in numerous studies and may be 
important here. Second, all downgrades are treated equally without considering whether it is a downgrade from a 
relatively good recommendation to a neutral recommendation, or a downgrade from a bad one to a worse one. If the 
market responds differently to different types of downgrades, then differences in the samples of pilot and control 
downgrades will result in different price responses for pilot and control stocks. 
 
To address these robustness issues, first, pilot and control samples are matched on firm size and book-to-
market ratio. Second, a distinction is made between “not so good” downgrades and “really bad” downgrades, and 
the tests run for these two sub-samples. “Not so good” downgrades are defined as the recommendation changes from 
“buy” to “overweight” or from “overweight” to “neutral”. The “really bad” downgrades are recommendation 
changes from “neutral” to “underweight” or from “underweight” to “sell”. 
 
Robustness test results consistently show the improved stock price efficiency for the pilot stocks during the 
post-SHO periods. To save the space, robustness test results are not presented but available upon requests. 
 
4.2 Stock Price Response to Analyst Downgrades During Normal Trading Hours 
 
Boehmer and Wu (2013) show that increased short selling activity associated with the suspension of uptick 
rules for pilot stocks directly improves stock price efficiency. But when this study examined the stock price 
efficiency in a direct intra-day fashion, the results show that short selling activities on the downgrade 
recommendation day do not directly contribute to the quicker stock price response to bad news because virtually all 
downgrade information has been incorporated into stock price before the market opens. To determine whether short 
selling is responsible for this price improvement it is necessary to examine shorting immediately before the 
downgrade event. In this section I investigate the intra-day price response and short selling around downgrade 
recommendations that occur during normal trading hours. 
 
From the full sample of downgrade recommendations, I select those published during the normal trading 
hours from 11:30am to 2:00pm. To ensure that these recommendations constitute substantial negative surprises, I 
require that these downgrades follow a prior upgrade. The final sample includes 133 control stock downgrades and 
78 pilot stock downgrades. Then I calculate the five-minute cumulative returns for a four-hour period beginning two 
hours before the release time of the recommendation and ending two hours after the release time. The returns 
between market opening and two hours before the recommendations are also calculated for both samples to account 
for possible information leakage before the recommendation downgrades. 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2015 Volume 31, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1351 The Clute Institute 
Figure 3. Stock Price Response to Downgrades during Normal Trading Hours during the Post-SHO Period 
 
 
Figure 3 graphs the intra-day return paths around the normal trading-hour downgrades for both pilot and 
control samples. It shows a more complete intra-day picture, which reveals that the pre-recommendation short 
selling may contribute to the enhanced price efficiency for pilot stocks. When the downgrade recommendation is 
released to the market at time 0, pilot stocks respond to bad news quicker and with greater magnitude. Pilot stocks 
begin to respond to the downgrade announcement approximately 85 minutes before the announcement, while there 
is no significant price response before the announcement for control stocks. This suggests that the suspension of the 
uptick rule on pre-recommendation short selling appears to contribute to the enhanced price efficiency for pilot 
stocks. This is a reasonable outcome, because, while informed short sellers are prevented from submitting shorting 
orders due to the uptick rule restrictions in control stocks when the stock price is declining. Now they can do so in 
pilot stocks by freely submitting down-tick shorting orders to take advantage of their private information, pushing 
stock prices down before the recommendation announcement. 
 
4.3 Shorting Activity and Stock Price Efficiency 
 
So far, it has been established that pilot stocks with no uptick rule restrictions respond to negative news 
contained in analyst downgrades more quickly than control stocks. But it has not been established that any shorting 
activity actually accompanies this price response. To test if there is a direct link between the pre-recommendation 
pilot stock price decline and short selling, I further examine the short selling activities around normal trading hour 
recommendations. 
 
The short ratio is calculated in every five minute interval as the ratio of the short volume during that 
interval to the average daily trading volume. This short ratio is then cumulated, starting two hours before the 
announcement and ending two hours after the announcement. Surprisingly, there is no significant difference in short 
selling between the pilot and the control sample. Pilot and control stocks are shorted about the same amount around 
a downgrade. However, Figure 3 suggests that pilot shorting activity is more effective at driving down the price. It is 
possible that there is a difference in market maker activity between the pilot and control stocks that may account for 
the differential price response. The SHO dataset lists the short classification entered for each transaction. A short 
trade is classified as either “short,” indicating that it would ordinarily be subject to a tick test rule, or “exempt,” 
indicating that it is exempt from a tick test rule, typically because the trade is made on behalf of a market-maker or 
dealer. During the SHO test period all trades on pilot stocks are technically “exempt” but dealers for the most part 
continued to mark them “short” and “exempt” and relied on the processing center to exempt pilot stocks from the 
tick test rule. This leaves us with a record of dealer (exempt) versus non-dealer (non-exempt) shorting activity for 
both pilot and control stocks. 
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Next, I proceed to separate short sale exempt orders submitted by market dealers who rely on the uptick 
rule exemption provisions in Rule 10a-1 from non-exempt orders. Results show that non-exempt short selling 
activities measured as a percentage of the average daily trading volume are smaller for pilot stocks than control 
stocks during the entire trading day, and that exempt short selling is greater for pilot stocks than for control stocks. 
This suggests that short selling around downgrades shifted from informed traders to market dealers. 
 
The analysis in this section reveals two possible activities that help to explain the relation between short 
selling and improved price efficiency. The first is that informed short sellers are less likely to short pilot stocks 
before downgrades, possibly because of concerns that short selling on pilot stocks will be more highly scrutinized 
than on control stocks. However, the remaining downtick shorting orders are still quite effective in pushing the price 
down. The second is that, as market makers and dealers observe reduced shorting in pilot stocks, they fill the 
liquidity gap to facilitate trading. These shorting orders may actually push the stock price down and help to improve 
price efficiency. 
 
It could be that short seller intentionally reduce their informed shorting during a two hour period prior to 
the recommendation due to the regulatory scrutiny during the Pilot Program. However, this conclusion is not strong 
due to the small sample size with only 89 observations for pilot stocks and 133 observations for control stocks. Also, 
identifying shorts marked as “non-exempt” as normal short sellers’ shorts might be problematic. About 0.5% of 
shorting orders are exempt from uptick rule tests during the pre-SHO period, while this percentage increased 
dramatically during the post-SHO period with 2.5% for control stocks and about 18% for pilot stocks. According to 
Regulation SHO, all shorting orders in pilot stocks should be marked as “exempt” during the post-SHO period. But 
shorting orders from market dealers submitted directly through the clearing house may be automatically marked as 
“non-exempt” orders. Considering this possibility, shorts marked as “exempt” may include shorts from both market 
dealers and normal short sellers. 
 
4.4 Discussion of the Market Opening Mechanism 
 
Thus far, neither normal-hour shorting on the recommendation day nor pre-recommendation shorting flows 
could explain the improved pilot stock price efficiency. It appears that short selling that occurs before day 0 may 
contribute to the improved price efficiency when the uptick rule restrictions are suspended for pilot stocks. 
 
Before Regulation SHO, short selling is allowed at the opening auction as long as it follows the 10a-1 rule 
which only allows uptick short selling orders. In the NYSE, short selling with minus tick at the opening is only 
allowed for certain types of foreign securities. After regulation SHO, however, downtick or zero-tick short selling at 
the open became available for non-exempt traders of pilot stocks. These added short sales may contribute to the 
enhanced stock price efficiency. When the NYSE specialists build open book, they observe many downtick short 
selling orders from aggressive short sellers. The batch auction mechanism at the NYSE opening may induce more 
short selling orders from aggressive short sellers, because it provides an opportunity for price improvement at the 
opening price. Also, specialists in the NYSE have a legal responsibility to share the open book information with 
other brokers and dealers, who may further share such information with institutional investors. Consequently, 
aggressive short sellers who held the most pessimistic opinions will be encouraged to submit more short selling 
orders with the lowest price. Ultimately, the competition amongst the aggressive short sellers at the opening auction 
greatly facilitates the process of impounding negative information into stock price before the market open bell. Note, 
however, that the opening return also includes any price change due to after-hour trading before the open. Therefore, 
it could be that both after-hour shorting and the market opening shorting orders contribute to the enhanced stock 
price efficiency when the uptick rule restrictions are removed. One of the limitations of this paper is that the lack of 
data on after-hours shorting and short selling orders at the market opening limits the ability of this study to further 
test this promising conjecture. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study hypothesizes that short sale constraints hamper stock price efficiency upon arrival of analyst 
downgrades. By examining the speed of which stock price response to analyst downgrades for pilot (short sale non-
constrained) stocks and control (short sale constrained) stocks, I find evidence supporting this hypothesis. For after-
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hours downgrades, pilot stocks respond quickly, with virtually all of the price response incorporated by the 
following open, while control stocks take an extra five minutes after opening to fully reflect the new information. 
Results are robust after accommodating size and book-to-market ratio matched sample and distinguishing “not so 
good” downgrades from “really bad” downgrades. To further investigate the role of short selling activity, I examine 
stock price response to analyst downgrades that occur during normal trading hours. It shows that downgrade 
information is partially incorporated into pilot stock prices up to two hours before the recommendation is released, 
while control stocks take up to an hour and a half after the release to impound the information into stock price, 
confirming that short sale constraints lower stock price efficiency.  In addition, the pre-recommendation price 
decline in pilot stocks is associated with lower levels of non-exempt shorting and higher levels of exempt shorting. 
Given lower levels of informed shorting, observed rapid price response occurs. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that short sale constraints reduce the efficiency in which new information are impounded into stock 
prices. 
 
The main findings of this paper lends credit to future research that utilizes data of after-hour shorting and 
shorting orders at the market opening auction to examine the importance of both after-hour trading and market 
opening in improving stock price efficiency when short sale constraints are relaxed. 
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